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Abstract 
The major aim of contract farming is to create ready market to farmers, provide agricultural inputs and 
agricultural extension services and improve productivity to farmers and contracting firms. Nevertheless, it is 
debatable as to whether smaller holder farmers or it is big companies that benefit from contract farming i.e 
benefit distribution in contract farming has not been well established. This study is an attempt to establish 
whether the benefits accrued under contract farming are fairly distributed among the farmers’ categories and 
companies’ central part of Tanzania. A cross sectional design was adopted for the study purposes. A total of 200 
farmers were randomly sampled and surveyed at Kongwa District in Dodoma region. Multiple methods of data 
collection were used ranging from household survey, Focus Group Discussion (FGDs) and Key Informant 
Interviews. The study found positive contribution of contract farming in productivity and income. Nevertheless, 
pricing arrangement in contracts were questionable. Mistrust of who gets what in the contracts prevail in the 
study area. The study recommends improvement in governance of contracts for better performance. 
Keywords: Agriculture, Contract Farming, Productivity and Agricultural markets 
 
Introduction 
Majority of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa live below poverty line (Chen and Martin, 2010), they depend 
on agriculture as their main source of livelihood. On the other-hand, agriculture in these countries is constrained 
by several factors including unreliable rainfall, lack of market, poor infrastructure and lack of improved 
agricultural inputs (Kaswamila and Masuruli, 2004). Tanzania is not excluded from such problems. Agriculture 
in Tanzania provides employment to over 80% of those who lives in rural area (World Bank, 2002, URT, 2001). 
Majority of the participants in agriculture are smallholder farmers depending heavily on rainfalls. As a result 
agriculture is stagnant and farmers continue to sink deeper into poverty (FAO, 2011). The problems facing small 
holder farmers in Tanzania do not differ significantly from other developing countries.  
The Tanzanian government and other development partners are not silent on the stagnation and 
widening of poverty to its rural population. The government has been providing several incentives to agricultural 
investors so that their growth would emulate smallholder farmers. In line with that according to the United 
Republic of Tanzania (URT, 2006), the government of Tanzania has been advocating for Public-Private-
Partnership (PPP) that would reverse the trend. In this case private sectors are encouraged to invest in 
agricultural sector as both producers and purchasers of the agricultural commodities from smallholder farmers 
(Gabagambi and George, 2012). 
Private sector has joined the government effort in investing in agriculture, where by large companies 
have introduced the concept of contract farming with smallholder farmers. Contract farming refers to the practice 
where two or more parties enter the agreement, where by one part act as a producers and the other as a buyer 
(Setboonsarng, 2008). Normally the buyer will facilitate the producer and create good production environment 
with expectation of buying the produce from producers (Warning and Key, 2002).  
The major aim of contract farming is to create ready market to farmers, provide agricultural inputs and 
agricultural extension services (Birthal et al., 2008). With these services at hand it is expected that agriculture 
will improve and on the other-hand income poverty of farmers will be alleviated. It is argued that contract 
farming accounts for around 15% of agricultural output in developed countries (Rehber, 2007). Improved 
productivity is directly linked with alleviating income poverty, for example in central Tanzania which is semi-
arid characterized by drought, and poverty, several initiatives have been undertaken to combat poverty. The 
initiatives includes promoting contract farming to sunflower and sorghum which are drought tolerant crops that 
are tolerant to the harsh condition and at the same time improve income to smallholder farmers. Nevertheless, it 
is debatable as to whether smaller holder farmers or it is big companies that benefit from contract farming. This 
study is an attempt to establish whether the benefits accrued under contract farming are fairly distributed among 
the farmers’ categories and companies central part of Tanzania. 
 
Theorizing Contract Farming  
Contract faming is not a new phenomenon in agriculture. It has been practiced in different parts of the world. 
Since 1970s the contract farming became an agenda and topic of interest in developing countries (Morrisey, 
1974; Glover, 1984; Minot, 1986, cited in Miyata et al., 2007). According to Errapa (2006) contract farming can 
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be defined as an agreement between farmers and processing and/or marketing firms for the production and 
supply of agricultural products under a forward agreement, generally at predetermined prices. Under the 
agreement the purchaser should offer a degree of supports to the farmer’s through provision of production inputs, 
technical assistance and also purchases the farmer’s products. While on the other side, farmers should commit 
themselves to produce agricultural produce according to the specifications in terms of quality, quantity and 
standards as stipulated by the purchasers and the supporting organization.  
Contract farming can also be defined as active vertical coordination between growers of an agricultural 
product and buyers or processors of that product (Tschirley et al., 2009). Usually characterized by a large firm 
with interest to enter into contracts with smallholder farmers either as individual, in groups or large farmers 
associations with the provision of inputs on credit and extension with the promise of delivering the produce. 
Also contract farming can be described as an agreement between one or more farmer(s) and a contractor for the 
production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements, frequently at pre-determined prices 
(Eaton and Shepherd, 2001 cited in Bijman, 2008). 
Theoretically, contract farming has some benefits to both smallholder farmers and supporting agent(s). 
It tends to offer improved incomes to producers and huge profits to sponsors, furthermore reducing some risks 
and uncertainties to both sides (Woodend, 2003). Moreover, the contract farming offers better access to 
extension services, technological supports, agro inputs and increased access to both local and international 
markets opportunities leading to improved food security and income earnings.  However, the prospective 
benefits accrued from contract farming vary with the nature of the contract.  
Although contract farming has a lot of notable merits, it is still subjected to criticism. It is argued that 
contract farming is not a universal solution in solving all problems faced by the smallholder farmers. Therefore, 
it has some contribution towards commercialization of smallholder farmers and its constraints should also be 
acknowledged. According to Woodend (2003) among of the critics of contract farming is involvement of the 
powerless smallholder farmers and powerful profit driven sponsors, hence imbalanced contract unless policies 
and other interventions to protect smallholder farmers are in place. Other critics include who is getting benefits 
from the contact whether the suppliers or the buyers. Studies by (Little and Watts, 1994; Singh, 2002 cited 
Miyata, et al., 2007) indicated that large firms tend to use contracts as the way of getting cheap labour and as the 
agent of transferring risk to farmers. Also the studies by Little and Watts (1994), showed that contract farming 
had been found to have imbalance of power between two parties, intra-household tensions over the allocation of 
the revenues and increasing rural inequality as contract farmers being rich to hire farm labours. Furthermore, it 
has been found that smallholder farmers will be marginalized since the sponsoring companies’ preferred to work 
with large and medium scale farmers resulting to rural inequality. 
Following the review on contract farming in Africa, in 1990s, Porter and Phillips-Howard (1997) 
concluded that farmers become well off when they participated in the contract farming although there are 
number of social problems which occurred in the communities. According to Birthal, Joshi, and Gulati (2005), 
the Gross Margin Analysis (GMA) and income accrued through contract farming for participants is found to be 
higher than the non-participants. For instance contract daily farmers in India the GMA and income generated 
were mostly double to those of independent dairy farmers, this is largely contributed by the presence of lower 
production and marketing costs for contract farmers than non-contract.  
There are five models of contract farming these include; centralized model, nucleus estate model, the 
multipartite model, informal model and intermediary model (Bijman, 2008).  Centralized model sometimes is 
also known as the classical contract farming model in which processor purchases produce from a population of 
smallholder farmers. This model has some strictness in the vertical coordination, thus the quality is strongly 
controlled and the quantity will be determined at the start of the season. The high degree of value addition is 
required for the products traded under this model, such as tea, sugar cane, poultry and vegetables.  
The second model is the nucleus estate model in which the contractor plays as the source for 
independent farmers as well as the owner of the production facilities such as estate plantation which can be 
utilized as the processing unit and/or research and breeding centre. This model is mostly applicable in perennial 
crops though it can also be used in other crops (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001 cited in Bijman, 2008).   
Third, is the multipartite model which is a joint venture involving a statutory body and a private 
company contracts with farmers. The public or private credit supporters, extension services and inputs provisions, 
might be the part of the deal. During liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, majority of nations especially 
developing ones enthusiastically invested in contract farming via joint ventures with private firms (Little and 
Watts, 1994 cited in Bijman, 2008). This type of model can be found in China where there were joint ventures 
between government departments and domestic and foreign investors in establishment of the processing unit as 
well as entering a contract farming agreement with local farmers (Sonntag et al., 2005, cited in Bijman, 2008). 
Carefully planned joint venture may offer appropriate control in its transactions with farmers and its vertical 
coordination might be strong. In the presence of public partner in the joint venture, the farmer-contractor 
relationship might be affected by the political affairs of the partner Bijman, 2008). 
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The fourth type is the informal model which involves individual entrepreneurs or small enterprises 
contracting with farmers informally basing on a seasonal especially for perishable products such as fresh fruits 
and vegetables. Perishable products usually require a small amount of processing such as sorting, grading and 
packaging. The success of the model depends on the presence of service providers, mostly offered by the 
government agencies (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001 cited in Bijman, 2008). This model also characterized by the 
provision of fewer options for vertical coordination compared with a more formal relationship.  
Lastly, is the intermediary model which has at least three parties; a processors or major trader formally 
contracts with a collector or middlemen who then informally contracts with several farmers towards contract 
farming agreement. The model is characterized by the combination of both centralized and informal models, also 
has a direct relationship between contractors and farmers. Although is it is common practice in Southeast Asia it 
has some disadvantages for vertical coordination and for providing proper incentives. 
 
Contract Farming in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Small scale farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) are characterized by the poorest people in the World 
(Tschirley et al., 2009). The main contributing factors towards their poverty are the low level of production and 
limited market opportunities for their produce.  Initiatives to reverse the trend are through emphasizing mass 
production of the agricultural produce under promising markets, and accessibility to credit (Tschirley et al., 
2009). Integration of stakeholders and introduction of contract farming in SSA might support governments and 
development partners to realize what role they should play to facilitate the promotion of contract farming 
throughout the region. 
Contact farming has been practiced in SSA for a number of crops for several years. Table below depict 
some selected countries which exercising contract farming in East and Southern Africa   (ESA). 
Table 1: Selected examples of contract farming (CF) in East and Southern Africa 
Country  Crops Comments 
Kenya Tea, sugar, 
export 
horticulture 
Tea and sugar have had very stable CF arrangements for many years. CF in 
export horticulture has been less stable, depending on the crop, conditions in 
the external market, policy and local factors 
Malawi Cotton 90% produced under CF with smallholder farmers. 
Mozambique Cotton, tobacco, 
paprika 
CF has persisted for 20 years in cotton and over a decade in tobacco. ~100% 
of these crops are produced under CF with smallholder farmers. The paprika 
scheme has failed. 
South Africa Various CF covers many commodities, and contracts tend to be more sophisticated. 
This is made possible by higher levels of education among farmers and more 
effective legal and regulatory systems in the country. 
Zambia 
 
Cotton, tobacco, 
paprika 
Nearly all produced under CF. 
 
Zimbabwe Cotton About 70% produced under CF. Prior to the prolonged economic crisis, the 
ability to purchase inputs reliably on the market allowed many farmers to 
produce cotton outside of CF arrangements. 
Source: (Tschirley et al., 2009) 
In East Africa for example, countries such as Kenya had contract farmers who are able to produce 60% 
of tea and sugar. Also success of horticultural and flower export sectors in Kenya had been brought in to a large 
extent by the contract farming which comprised smallholders and large commercial farmers (Harris 1992; Dolan 
and Humphrey 2000). In South Africa, contract farming is extensive in various commodities and is more 
sophisticated as compared to contracts in other countries in SSA (Vermeulen et al., 2006). In these contracts 
there are several transformations related with types of commodities, length of contract period and the proportions 
of smallholder and large scale commercial farmers. The desire to enter into the contract farming in SSA on the 
part of government and farmers were contributed much by the weakness and fragmentation of the markets.  
The markets for farmers’ products mostly are unstable and unreliable, resulting majority of the 
smallholder farmers failing to secure specialized inputs contributed by the absence of the credit markets. As a 
consequence smallholders farmers’ fail to strengthen their production capacity in favour of the attractive market 
opportunities (Tschirley et al., 2009). The capabilities of producing crops which requires some significant 
purchased inputs to increase the quantity as well as emphasize on the quality will be hindered under these 
situations. To counteract the circumstances, government and farmers considered contract farming as an 
alternative strategy to these problems, providing inputs on credit to farmers and assurance to purchase their 
produce.  
 
Contract Farming in Tanzania 
Tanzania is not excluded from practicing contract farming as a strategy to improve agricultural productivity and 
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marketing. A good example of contract farming in Tanzania is in cotton. Ideally, the contract farming in cotton, 
comprise private-companies in assisting farmers and ginners jointly investing in land, labour, credit, specific 
inputs, education and technology related with the produce in mutual benefit basis. In this case, ginners formulate 
a platform which helps Tanzanian rural farmers to secure various means of production to switch themselves to be 
productive cotton farmers. There are various private-company attracted with the contract farming in Tanzania 
such as Rural Livelihood Development Company (RLDC) and Bio-Sustain.   
The challenges and success of contract farming in cotton has attracted other companies to invest in 
other cash-crops in Tanzania. For example, in Dodoma and Singida, various companies are now investing in 
sunflower and sorghum through contract farming. These companies provide inputs and technical supports to 
smallholder famers with a contract to purchase the produce from those farmers. Nevertheless a big challenge that 
exist is mistrust of the two parties, where as farmers are not comfortable with pricing of their produce. On the 
other hand companies are worried about dishonest farmers selling their produce to other buyers (side selling) 
(TNBC, 2010). 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Study Area and Justification for its Location 
The study was carried out in Dodoma region in Tanzania. The region is located in semi-arid area characterized 
by inadequate rainfall and low agricultural productivity. Recently there had been a tremendous shift of the 
population in this region towards farming sorghum and sunflower. These crops are drought tolerant and survive 
harsh conditions. Proper utilization of the two cash crops in the region might help the initiatives to alleviate 
poverty. Farmers from Kongwa district who engaged in sorghum and sunflower farming under contractual and 
non-contractual agreements were involved in the study so that to draw the inference.  
 
Research Design  
This study was adopted a cross-sectional research design. This method allows data to be collected at one point in 
time and establishes relationships between variables for the purpose of testing the hypotheses (Bailey, 1998). 
The approach is convenient for studying large and diverse population such as famers involved in contract 
farming in the selected Dodoma region.  
 
Sampling  
The study adopted a multi-stage sampling technique, the technique is important because it allows multiple 
methods of sampling that yield a representative and convenient study sample with a purpose of addressing the 
sampling needs in the most effective and efficient ways (Trochim, 2006).  Region and district was sampled 
purposively due to the potentiality in production of sorghum and sunflower at the central corridor. A list of 
participants and non-participant farmers in contract farming was generated in selected district and simple random 
sampling was employed to pick individual farmers, the actual sampling unit. Sorghum and sunflower farmers 
were sampled from Kongwa district. In addition to farmers, purposive sampling was also employed to pick key 
informants for in-depth interview. Two hundred (200) farmers were selected for the study purpose. The study 
sampled 100 farmers participating in contract farming and 100 farmers that are not engaged in contract farming. 
That means 50 farmers who are involved in sorghum contract farming and the other 50 who are not in any 
contractual arrangement were sampled. Likewise 50 farmers involved in sunflower contract farming and the 
remaining 50 who are not involved in sunflower contract farming were sampled. 
 
Data Collection Methods 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection were applied. The use of different methods of data 
collection helped to ensure the quality of the findings by triangulation and enable to make generalization of the 
findings. Qualitative data were collected through appropriate Focus Group Discussion (FGD) techniques with 
members of the community. Interview with stakeholders in the sunflower and sorghum contract farming 
provided another qualitative data set that was used to enrich the study. Quantitative data was collected through 
household survey with smallholder farmers in the study area. Furthermore, the research employed documentary 
review, using document analysis to complement interviews and questions.   
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
The field survey resulted into two forms of data set that is quantitative and qualitative data. The qualitative data 
which were mostly deduced from Focus Group Discussions were transcribed and content analysis was further 
employed to analyze them. Quantitative data from field survey was coded, processed and analyzed using the 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS 16 version) computer software. Descriptive and inferential 
statistics was used in describing relationship between variables and testing for significance of the findings.  
Developing Country Studies                                                                                                                                                              www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-607X (Paper) ISSN 2225-0565 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.3, 2017 
 
5 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Households Background Characteristics 
A total of 200 households were surveyed. An average household size was found to be 5 members. The findings 
concur with HBS (2007) that an average household size in Tanzania had 5 members. Large household size in the 
surveyed districts serves as a source of labour. Average age for the surveyed households was found to be 36 
years. The average age of respondents shows availability of high productive force in the study area. Majority of 
the respondents (75.5 %) in the surveyed area have had primary education. Low education level of the 
respondents could be linked with low level of income and development of the surveyed community. Table 
4.1.shows the background characteristics of the surveyed households. 
Table 1: Background Characteristics of Sample Survey 
 Kongwa District  
Divisions  
Kibaigwa Mlali Zoisa Kongwa Ngomani Nembo       Total 
N=34 N=95 N=8 N=59 N=2 N=2 N=200 
Age of 
respondent 18-34 
5 29 2 17 1 2 56 
35-54 21 55 4 33 1 0 114 
55-64 6 6 2 6 0 0 20 
>=65 2 5 0 3 0 0 10 
Sex of 
respondents Male 
24 60 7 40 0 2 133 
Female 10 35 1 19 2 0 67 
Primary (1-7) 30 72 6 40 1 2 151 
Education 
status of 
respondents O-level (S1-S4) 
2 3 2 0 0 0 7 
A-level(S5-S6) 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
University 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
No formal 
education 
0 20 0 19 1 0 40 
Contract farming Versus Agricultural Productivity 
The study established productivity per acreage on the study area. Results showed positive contributions 
of contract farming in terms of yield (See Table 2). The average yield (in kgs) per acreage before and after 
contractual agreements in sunflower was 336.7 and 596.3 respectively, and for sorghum before and after 
contractual agreements was found to be 366.8 and 678.8 kgs per acreage. The increase could possibly be 
associated with availability of improved seeds and inputs that farmers get from companies under contract. In 
some other cases the companies also provide extension services to farmers they contract. Similar findings were 
reported by Young and Hobbs, (2002) who assert that contract farming accounted for 39% of the total value of 
US agricultural production in 2001. This implies that if well managed the contract farming is potential on 
boosting agricultural productivity of any nation. 
Table 2: Average yield before and After Contract Farming 
Yields per acreage (Kgs) 
Type of Crops Sunflower Sorghum 
Statistics Before CF After CF Before CF After CF 
Mean 336.70 596.30 366.80 678.80 
Minimum 30.00 60.00      5.00 200.00 
Maximum 1500.00 2500.00 1500.00 1150.00 
 
Contract Farming on Smallholder Farmers’ Income 
Various studies appreciate the promotion of smallholder farmers through contract farming since it tend to 
improve technical efficiency in production and market assurance and potentially leading to improvement in 
farmers’ incomes, hence contribute to the reduction of their income poverty (Eaton and Shepherd, 2001, Birthal 
et al (2008). This is also a case in Tanzania particularly in Dodoma region in Kongwa district where this study 
was conducted. It has been found that, average income accrued by smallholder farmers under contractual 
agreements was TShs. 753, 560/= and non-contractual farmers is TShs.470, 543/=as displayed in Figure 1 below. 
It should be noted from figure one that, the maximum income for farmers under contract farming was also higher 
i.e TShs 10,000,000/= while that of non-contractual farmer was TShs 3,000,000/=. The difference in income 
could be attributed to many factors including availability of improved inputs and easy access to markets for 
contracted farmers as opposed to non-contracted farmers. 
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Figure 1: Income Distribution of Farmers 
 
Performance of Contract Farming in Creating Agricultural Markets 
Contract farming basically is a market driven service and both involved parties should eventually benefit from 
such market driven services (MMA, 2006). In Kongwa district, the study found that, there are five (5) companies 
involved in contract farming for sunflower and sorghum crops. Among of them include Kenya Breweries 
Limited (KBL), Kibaigwa Flour Suppliers (KFS), Uncle Millo, Angeloma and Mangos. Respondents admitted 
that their main selling point is the market principally created by the companies under contractual agreements. 
Although farmers under contractual agreements seems to access the market for their products easily, but their 
main problem remains on pricing. In most cases the contracts are presupposed to have a clause of price 
determinants, i.e market price, or pre-determined price. There has to be an agreement between farmers and the 
companies on the pricing determinants but this seems not to be the case in the study area. At one of the FGD, it 
was argued that; 
“…Normally, we enter into agreement with companies on producing either sorghum or sunflower. 
Depending on the nature of a company. The pricing issue in most cases is determined by the companies 
themselves, we don’t have much power to negotiate on the same, and otherwise we would lose the 
support…” (FGD, 2014) 
From the discussion, one would note that, despite a crucial importance of contract in providing reliable markets, 
but the main challenge remains on ability of farmers to negotiate for better prices in the same.  
 
Mode of Payments 
The companies under contracts agree with smallholder famers on the payment modes which will be suitable to 
both parties. In many contracts, companies provides inputs to famers with agreement of deducting the cost of 
inputs and paying the remaining dues to farmers. The study noted a prevailing mistrust between the two parties. 
Farmers were arguing that, the cost of inputs were inflated so as to maximize companies’ profits. In an interview 
with one farmer, he said;   
“…After harvesting my sunflower, I take them to the xxx company that I have a contractual agreement 
with them. The first thing they do is to deduct the cost of inputs they have provided to me and then pay 
the balance to me. But honestly I am not satisfied with the costs of inputs, I think they tend to inflate 
them…” (Interview, 2014) 
Further interviews with some companies reveal that, their cost for inputs are based on prevailing market prices of 
the same and no exaggerations are done. But this does not surpass opinions from farmers whom they think some 
exaggerations is done on costs to maximize companies’ profit. 
 
Governance of Contract Farming  
This Agreements in contract are construed and enforced in accordance with the laws of the United Republic of 
Tanzania. In such case actors in the governance of contracts are farmers, companies and the Government of 
Tanzania. It should be borne in mind that companies and the government has skilled and professionals in legal 
aspects. On the other hands farmers are not much well acquainted with legal issues, worse enough is some other 
cases these farmers are not even able to read or write. For example in this study it was found that 19% of farmers 
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were not able to read and write (See Figure 2). In such cases they are just signing (thumb print) the contracts 
without actually knowing what exactly is in the contracts. Although no any legal measures has been noted during 
the survey but it is worth that contracts be reviewed by the governments through Local Government Authority 
(Legal department) to safe guard farmers interests. Additionally farmers could also take advantage of producer 
organizations (if the exists) to negotiate on their behalf and make contract farming a success 
 
Figure 2: Farmers Literacy Level 
 
Who Benefits in the Contract Farming 
If benefits are treated in subjective terms then, conclusively we would say in contract farming both parties do 
benefit. Farmers benefit from increased productivity as a result of access to improved inputs, extension services 
and access to markets while companies benefit by being able to sustainably get the products from contracted 
farmers. Being objectively, we would draw other conclusion basing on who gets what in the agreements. The 
major aim of any company is to maximize profit. Such that in the contractual agreement they would do their best 
to maximize profit and reduce their transaction costs. These are done at the expenses of producers who are the 
farmers. In such cases farmers are at the cross-border of earning less in the contracts. What is to be done then? 
While we maintain the idea of improving agriculture practices, productivity, marketing and livelihood of farmers 
and also sustaining the contracting companies the following are imperative to be done; (i) Formation and 
strengthening of farmers groups that have voice in bargaining during contract design (this is highly missing, 
many contracts are designed by companies and farmers does not have strong bargaining power) (ii) Governance 
of contract farming is another area that has to be looked into very carefully. Currently there is lose governance of 
the same resulting into benefit skewing highly to one end, (iii) capacity building in area of basics of contractual 
management is very important especially to farmers who desire to engage in contract farming.  
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